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To secure a just and equitable representation of the people
in Parliament is a matter which has at all times engaged the
attention of thoughtful, practical legislators, and of great
thinkers. That the idealist should be far in advance of the
practical legislator is what we must naturally expect ; for in
their ideal schemes of " The Best Form of Grovernment," or
" The Best Form of Representation," the former may easily
overlook or surmount obstacles by assumptions which are not
open to the practical legislator who attempts to reduce any
ideal to practice. If knowledge and justice were synonymous,
there would be less difficulty as regards the attainment of an
ideally perfect representation, for this might be secured by
basing the electorate upon some common fixed minimum
standard of education. But the practical legislator cannot
entertain this dream, for his experience has too well taught
him that selfishness and injustice are not eliminated by
greater intelligence, nor is the sense of justice necessarily
absent where the intelligence is small. An education
standard, therefore, only helps us a very little way towards
securing a basis for the formation of a just representation of
the people. Indeed, another chapter in history is no longer
necessary to us to demonstrate that the great barrier to
just representation in the future is immediate self-interest, not
ignorance. Self-interest is not always base, in the sense of
being restricted to the individual, although it is always
distinguished as the centre of those graduated rings of
sympathies and interests which are in greatest harmony with
those of the individual. These rings of sympathies, however,
are themselves variable and complex, and sometimes conflict
with each other.
The interests and sympathies which most strongly affect
all individuals in common are approximately related to the
individual in the following order, which, in a general way,
correspond with a diminution of intensity, viz.:
Public Interests.
2. Family
Individuals of the Family
Group.
Family.
Invariable, and simple
within the Family
Group.
Practically the same.
Head of Family.
4 National
±
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From this analysis we perceive that an ideally just repre-
sentation of the people must be based upon the family,
whose interests from a social point of view are in common,
and are usually centred in one person, who by nature and
affection stands as their natural guardian and representative
to the outer world. At this stage the foe to just represen-
tation at a later stage is rendered comp^iratively harmless by
the short range yet locally dominating altruistic attributes,
such as the spontaneous love, affection, friendship, or powerful
sense of duty, always more or less active, either in subduing
the narrower forms of selfishness within the family group, or in
so modifying its influence as to become beneficial, not harm-
ful, to the family interest as a whole.
Any scheme of representation, therefore, which would aim
at penetrating the solidarity of the family by proffering
separate electoral rights to each of its existing component
members would do more harm than good, ior it would destroy
the true foundation upon which good government rests,
viz., the altruistic virtues evoked and fostered within the
family circle. The question of Female Svffrage is reduced to
11 small compass when considered from this point of view.
The natural guardian of each family is also, as a rule, the
breadwinner, and therefore the naiuvally e/ec^ecZ representative
of the dependent wife, child, or relative. It is manifest also
that artificial representation should only begin where natural
representation ends, i.e
,
in the natural representative of the
family. It excludes the dependants, not merely because they
are females, or because the male dependants are under 21
years of age, but mainly because all such are naturally com-
prehended in their natural representative—the householder.
There is no artificial determination of what constitutes a
householder. Whatever natural condition exists which calls
one person out to be regarded as the head of the family group
suffices—whether it be the father, widowed mother, elder
brother, or elder sister—so long as such one is regarded by
the family group as the nominal head or guardian. The
natural unit of the electorate of any population is the
"Householder"—not "males 21 years of age and over."
The males of a population, 21 years of age and over, as
such have no natural right to be singled out from
women and children as representative electors of the commu-
nity other than the savage one of being the stronger. Of
course there are reasons, if not rights, why single men of 21
years and over may have some claim to electoral privileges,
e.g.'. 1. They may not be represented by any natural guardian
or householder. 2. They may be independent breadwinners,
and thus independently contribute to the taxation necessary
for the government of the country. 3. They may specially he
drawn upon to defend the State in the case of war or disturbance
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to the peace of the community . But the two fust reasons also
apply to all single adult female breadwinners, who are neither
householders nor represented by natural guardians. It is the
third reason w^hich alone gives a special claim to single adult
male breadwinners who are neither householders nor repre-
sented by any natural guardian. Still the grounds upon
which their title to vote as electors rest are much inferior to
householders who are also natural guardians and representa-
tives of the greater half of the population. The former are
units, which represent themselves alo7ie ; the latter not only
represent themselves, but also represent on the average from
two to three dependent persons, the support of whom corre-
spondingly increases the amount of taxation which each
householder contributes to the support of government. If,
therefore, the single adult breadwinner has a legitimate claim
to be an elector, the householder's claim is at least three-fold
greater.
From what has been observed it is manifest that each
electoral district should be represented in Parliament as
nearly as practicable in accordance with the number of its
population rather than with the numbers of electors, as urged
by some. This, however, is a purely theoretical considera-
tion; for in a general way the electors of a given district are
nearly in the same proportion to all electors as its population
is to the total population. But in exceptional cases, where it
is not so, the population base for equitable representation
has a much greater claim than the electoral base. There are
other considerations why the ^population quota is preferable
to the elector quota in determining the representative value
of any electoral district. Many electors have votes for more
than the one district in which the elector and his family
resides. Such an one cannot be placed upon equality with
the resident elector whose whole interest, including his
dependants (non-electors) are bound up in the particular
district. The non-resident elector element in the elector quota,
therefore, destroys its value, and strengthens the grounds upon
which representation by jpopulation quota is sustained. But
some may still urge the old fallacious plea, Has property no just
claim to representation ? So far as the general government
of anew country is concerned, the interests of property-holders
are quite as varied and conflicting as the population interests
^er se, and the population of a particular district has more
interests in common with the property interests within
its border than have the property interests of different
districts with each other ; e.g.: The burning question in young
colonies is the development of its lands and industries rather
than incidence of taxation, and the aid of the G-eneral
Government in the construction of roads, bridges, harbours,
railways, telegraphs, etc., is the rock upon which the interests
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of property, and people alike, split up into rival interests.
The interests of the locality in young colonies are therefore
upon the whole the dominating ones ; and in these conflicts
the local interests of population and property are in unison
so far as local matters are concerned, and together they are
in rivalry with similarly combined interests of other localities.
Moreover, it must be borne in mind that it is only in matters
relating to Municipal Government that property, as such, has
a just claim for special consideration in matters relating to
representation.
The whole of the advantages secured in urban communities
under Municipal Government may include Water Supply, For-
mation and Repairs to Streets and Footpaths, Sanitation, Pro-
tection to Persons and Eeal and Personal Property, Parks
and Recreation Grounds, Street Lighting, etc. The enjoy-
ment of all such benefits may be said to be equally distributed
to each member of the community. That is, no matter
whether any one person of the community pays little, much,
or none of the taxation necessary to provide for most of these
common benefits, each individual has the enjoyment of them
equally. It is therefore reasonable that some extra share of
the control and distribution of such common advantages
should be placed in the hands of those who individually con-
tribute the greatest share of the taxation necessary to provide
for them.
Without such a safeguard it is conceivable that the
luxurious demands of a majority who pay little or nothing
towards their provision and maintenance might, by an
extravagance which does not touch their pockets, almost ruin
the minority, who are forced to defray the expenditure.
Having touched upon three distinct considerations which are
somehow to be taken into account (Population, Electors, and
Property) in the determination of any just and equitable
representation of the people, it has been shown that so far as
the functions delegated to a General Government are con-
cerned, the best form of representation should be based rather
upon the population quota method than upon either the
elector or property quota, or upon any combination of these.
It is advantageous, however, to show that population per se
is not only theoretically the fairer method, but from the
nature of things it fundamentally determines the number of
electors as well as the amount of property. For whatever
differences may be shown by individual districts from one
another, on the whole, the population quota to the total
population will yield for nearly all districts the same repre-
sentation as the elector quota does relative to the total
number of electors, or as the property quota does relative
to the total amount of property Indeed, broadly speaking,
the number of the population is not only the fundamental
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cause or root of the dimensions of the other two categories,
but it may be safelj taken as a unit measure or index of
them. This is significallj illustrated by the following con-
trasts with respect to the principal divisions of Tasmania,
taking a common division (40) for determining the respective
quotas :
—
•uop-epdoj
•xo.xdd Y
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Practically the proportion per quota of electors and popu-
lation yield the same result in the detail representation for
each sub-division ; and the proportion per quota of property
i» remarkably close upon the whole.
Nay, so far as urban populations are concerned, the pro-
portion per quota yielded by Property, Electors, and
Populations invariably shows the very closest correspondence,
thus :
—
-
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It may so happen that during the conflict of one election
his mind may be dominated by the first of these, as in the
case of the present elections in Ulster, i.e., by religious
sympathies. At another time class interests may dominate,
as when the question of the day turns upon the relations
between Capital and Labour. Again, if the burning question
of the day turns upon rival routes for railways, or for the
fair claims of the district to a share in the expenditure for
the construction of roads or important public works, the
locality interests of the individual electors may for the time
being become the dominant ones in determining his action or
choice. The definition of electoral boundaries, however
determined, and so long as they are fairly represented on the
basis of population, do not involve serious difiiculties to the
individual elector in exercising his influence upon the Central
Oovernraent with respect to his various and variable interests,
if we except the interests of locality.
To afford the individual the full force of his electoral
privileges in respect of locality, it is necessary that the
interests of all electors within any distinct electoral areai
should be in harmony, i.e., that no important portion of the
district should act as a dead weight owing to its locality
interests being on geographical or other grounds more
identified with some neighbouring electoral district than with
its own.
How to secure fair representation on the basis of numbers
whilst still preserving intact the solidarity of locality interests
is the great problem which the practical politician has to
solve ; and it is a problem which is surrounded with many
more practical difficulties than any of the schemes for repre-
sentation which are confined to the representation of the
person alone. It would not be difficult to divide the country
into distinct electoral districts, whose locality interests are
fairly identical, solely upon some physical or geographical
basis. Nor would it be a difficult matter to cut up the whole
country into electoral district units oh the basis of popu-
lation alone.
The practical difficulty only appears when we try to obtain
an electoral district unit of representation which will fairly
coincide with both of these important considerations.
As a matter of fact, the perfect attainment of such an ideal
is utterly impossible. To secure one of its important aims
rigidly would in most cases only be attained by the sacrifice
of ideal fairness in respect of the other. Fairly perfect units
coinciding in both aims would be purely accidental, tem-
porary and exceptional.
Let us examine this matter a little more closelv.
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Locality interests should mainly be determined by the
following circumstances :
—
Desiderata, or Principles.
1. The interests of the principal industries carried on
within the district are not of a conflictiDg character,
i.e., they are mainly Agricultural, Pastoral, Mineral,
or Industrial, as the case may be.
2. The main channels of communication by Road or Eail
are common to the particular sub-divisions contained
therein.
3. The minor or Road Districts included within the
district are so far harmonious that they meet in
common in the trunk system of the particular
Electoral District.
4. The centre or centres for the administration of justice,
law, protection, and registration within the district
are more convenient to all its sub-divisions than to
the corresponding centres of neighbouring Electoral
Districts, allowance being made as regards the
borderlands, especially of Rural Districts and Urban
Districts, where it must ever happen that the
inhabitants of a Rural District Boundary touching
an Urban District Boundary are nearer, or as near,
to the Urban centres than to those of their own.
These are the principal conditions wbich determine the
nature of an ideally perfect electoral district based upon
locality interests.
The conditions which are demanded by representation on
tlie basis of population are, that every electoral district
shall, as nearly as possible, contfiin one quota of the total
population, or in exceptionally populous geographically undi-
Tided districts two or more comjplete quotas !
But the density of population of many large distinct
geographical areas is so small that it would require to unite
as many of them as would cover an area of 3,280 square
miles (Franklin) to enable us to satisfy the claims of fairness
of representation on the basis of numbers, that is, one quota
of the total population ; while others (Hobart city) are so
dense that 1"98 square miles embraces as many jDersous as
would fairly constitute seven complete quotas. But how are
we to reconcile two rival claims for distinct representation,
one of which we may call the geographical unit, is rigidly
fixed for all time, and the other— the population unit—which
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"varies each day in accordance with the actual changes
brought about, naturally by births and deaths, and artificially
by constant movements of the population to or from old or
new centres of population ? Even if we could fix an exact
and coincidentally fair representation for all districts at any
one moment, such is the variableness of growth or decline
ever going on in various districts that it would certainly
be out of perfect harmony in both respects within the space
of a few weeks.
It is clear, therefore, that the ideal of a perfectly exact and
fair representation on the basis of distinct natural geogra-
phical units and single population or electoral quotas is
practically unattainable, and therefore any objections that
may be put forward on such grounds to any scheme of
representation whatever, will in itself be no conclusive
evidence against or for such a scheme, whether good or bad.
It will only amount to a truism expressive of the fact tliat
the impossible lias not been achieved. It is, however, prac-
ticable to attain a fair approximation to our ideal in both its
important aspects if the two standards of fair and equitable
representation be used as tests for measuring the relative
value of different plans which most nearly satisfy their
claims.
The following are the principles by which a fair and just
scheme of Representation may always be preserved, which
unites the distinct claims of the solidarity of distinct
geographical units with those which rest on the claims of
numbers :
—
Principles.
1. Preserve all Geographical Districts as Single Electoral
Districts, whose population does not exceed or fall
below the population or Electoral quota by 25 per
cent.
2. Unite two or more sparsely populated but distinct
Geographical Districts, so that combined they
approximate to a full Electoral quota.
3. Where two contiguous Geographical Districts already
constitute two single Electoral Districts, only ^ive
two Eepresentatives taken separately, but if united
would represent three quotas nearly.—Unite the
two to form a single Three-member District, with
;.
the consent of the Representatives of the original
^. ,
_
'i
districts in cases where it is impracticable to lorui
J..,.
•• a third separate district whose boundaries would
.-,.,^^_, '
•,
.^
not
, transgress in matters essential to Locality
Interests.
B
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4. In fixing the total number of Eepresentatives leave a
margin in the aggregate, so that from time to time
a single member may be added—in case of a new
centre springing rapidly into existence, or an old one
suddenly expanding—without any disturbance to
other districts, which comparatively may be
unaffected in their relation to the Electoral quota
—
e.g : If the normal number be determined to be 40, fix
the standard thus, " not less than 40 and not
exceeding 44."
5. In areas that are progressive do not add an additional
member for excess of quota until it reaches at least
76 per cent, of the full quota.
6. In declining areas do not cancel the representative of
a geographical unit or Electoral District until the
deficiency below the quota falls below it by 40 per
cent, of the said quota.
7. Where two contiguous Electoral Districts exist, one
decreasing in numbers and the other making a
corresponding increase, adjustment may be pre-
served in relation to quota either by amalgamating
the two as a single Two-member District, or if not
infringing upon the solidarity of Locality Interests
of one of them, annex one or more of the complete
sub-divisions—say Eoad Districts—to the smaller
population, where it would produce the desired
distribution of population.
8. As Local Taxation is levied on the basis of Assess-
ment Eolls relating to Eoad Trusts and Municipal
Districts, and as Population Statistics are obtained
in relation to Eegistration Districts, it is absolutely
necessary for determining the Population, Amount
of Property, and Trade and Industry of any
Division, whether Electoral, Municipal, Eegistra-
tion, or Eoad Trust, that there should be a
systematised plan of harmony between the smaller
and the larger divisions.
In urban districts the municipal area should be a multiple
exactly of the electoral unit. In rural districts the
municipal area should be an exact multiple of complete road
district divisions plus its non-road district area regarded
as one of the units : and the municipal and electoral district
should be so related that the larger of the two should be an
«xact multiple of the other. The registration district
should be identical with one or more multiples of some
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of the aforesaid divisions. In this way information
relating to Population, Trade and Industry and Property
obtained by any of the modes now in operation could be
readily related to any of the several forms of district
groupings. The grand principle of harmony of districts
being that the larger division boundary should coincide exactly
with the corresponding outermost limits of the lesser but
complete divisions contained within it. Negatively it may be
stated as follows :
—
{a.) Any Eoad District should not form parts of two
or more Municipal Districts.
(b.) Any Municipal District should not form parts of
two or more Electoral Districts.
(c.) Any Electoral District (Urban Centres perhaps
excepted) should not form parts of two or more
Municipal Districts.
To secure with greatest economy the valuation of property
or the state of any industry, the Rolls or Shedules should
not be based solely upon the alphabetical order of either
streets or names of persons (occupiers), but rather the
alphabetical order should be subordinate to one of the
smaller systematic sub-diyision of municipal districts, thus:
—
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